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HOME EQUITY LOANS IN TEXAS:
MAINTAINING THE TEXAS TRADITION
OF HOMESTEAD PROTECTION
Julia Patterson Forrester*
OE McKnight has long been an authority on Texas homestead law,
teaching and writing on the subject from the point of view of legal
historian, expert on matrimonial property rights, and scholar of cred-
itor's rights. In fact, if any subject best embodies the intersection of these
three interests of Professor McKnight, it is the law of the Texas home-
stead.' As a result, Professor McKnight teaches about the Texas home-
stead in courses on Texas matrimonial property rights, creditor's rights,
and American legal history. In addition, he has written numerous articles
on Texas homestead law 2 and has been involved in guiding the Texas Leg-
islature in matters relating to the homestead. 3
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law, Dallas, Texas; B.S.E.E. 1981, J.D. 1985, The University of Texas at Austin. I wish to
thank Paul Rogers for his comments on drafts of this Article and Robin Kirshbaum and
Chris Wilmoth for their research assistance. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the re-
search grant provided by the Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University.
1. My scholarly interests are slightly different-property law, real estate finance, and
bankruptcy, but these also fuel my interest in the home, the homestead, and home mort-
gage financing. Thus, I, like Professor McKnight, am interested in Texas homestead law,
especially with respect to liens on homestead property. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Con-
structing a New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REV.
1095 (1996) [hereinafter Home Improvement Financing]; Julia Patterson Forrester, Mort-
gaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion
of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373 (1994) [hereinafter Home Equity
Financing].
2. Joseph W. McKnight, Mexican Roots of the Homestead Law, ESTUDIOS JURIDICOS
EN HOMENAJE AL MAESTRO GUILLERMO FLORES MARGADANT 291-304 (1988); Joseph W.
McKnight, Texas Homestead Law, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1307 (1986); Joseph W. McKnight,
Property Code Amendments 85-2 TEX. ST. B. FAM. L. SEC. REP. 52 (1985); Joseph W.
McKnight, Protection of the Family Home from Seizure by Creditors: The Sources and
Evolution of a Legal Principle, 86 Sw. L.Q. 369 (1983) [hereinafter Sources and Evolution];
Joseph W. McKnight, Modernization of Texas Debtor-Exemption Statutes Short of Constitu-
tional Reform, 35 TEX. B.J. 1137 (1972); Joseph W. McKnight, The Spanish Legacy in Texas
Law, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 222 (1959). In addition, Professor McKnight has written a
section of the SMU Law Review's Annual Survey of Texas Law on either family law or
matrimonial property each year since 1969, and these surveys frequently discuss homestead
law issues. See, e.g., Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 53 SMU L.
REv. 995, 1025-33 (2000); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 52 SMU
L. REV. 1143, 1164-70 (1999).
3. Professor McKnight was the principal draftsman of Article XVI, Section 51 of the
Texas Constitution adopted in 1983 and of Chapter 41 of the Texas Property Code adopted
in 1985.
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I have been fortunate indeed to have a mentor like Joe MCKnight in the
office catty-corner to mine. I cannot count the number of times I have
wandered into his office with an obscure question about homestead or
creditor's rights law. He is always willing to discuss my problem, and I
am pleased that he also comes to my office to discuss legal issues. I thus
feel privileged to write for this issue of the SMU Law Review honoring
Joe, and I have chosen for my subject the most significant recent change
in Texas homestead law-the amendment of the Texas Constitution to per-
mit home equity loans in Texas.
In the past five years, the legislature has proposed and the voters of
Texas have approved some of the most drastic changes to Texas home-
stead law ever made. In November of 1997, Texas voters approved an
amendment to the Texas Constitution that for the first time permits Texas
homeowners to obtain home equity loans. 4 Before the constitutional
amendment became effective on January 1, 1998, Texas was the only state
that prohibited home equity loans. Texas remains the state most protec-
tive of the homestead, in part, because of the numerous constitutional
restrictions on home equity loans.
This Article examines home equity financing in Texas, focusing on how
continued protection of the homestead shelters Texas homeowners from
problems experienced by some homeowners in other states. In Part I of
the Article, I briefly explore the history of homestead protection and
home equity loans in Texas, a subject on which Joe MCKnight literally
wrote the book. In Part II, I discuss the growth of home equity loans in
other states, the reasons for their popularity, and the problems that have
arisen for homeowners who have been victimized by predatory lenders.
Part III examines the constitutional amendment that ultimately permitted
home equity lending in Texas, focusing on the consumer protection re-
quirements of the provision and how they are aimed at preventing preda-
tory lending practices. In Part IV, I discuss criticism aimed at the
amendment and problems that have arisen in interpreting and applying it.
Part V discusses the limited legislative response to these issues and the
court cases interpreting the amendment. In the Conclusion, I address the
criticisms of the constitutional provision and defend its consumer protec-
tion measures.
I. HISTORY OF HOMESTEAD PROTECTION AND HOME
EQUITY LENDING
The notion of the homestead as property protected from the reach of
creditors first developed on the Texas frontier.5 A statute of the Mexican
4. TEX. CONsTr. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6). The amendment also permits reverse mortgage
loans for elderly Texas homeowners for the first time. Id. § 50(a)(7). Lenders initially
would not make reverse mortgage loans because of conflicts between state constitutional
requirements and federal regulatory requirements. Reverse mortgage loans are beyond
the scope of this article.
5. McKnight, Sources and Evolution, supra note 2, at 369.
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state of Coahuila y Texas extended exemption principles originating in
Castilian law to land grants, 6 and an act of the Republic of Texas defined
exempt land to include the family home.7 When Texas became a state in
1845, the framers of the Texas Constitution placed a homestead exemp-
tion provision in the Constitution.8 Other states followed Texas' lead,
and by the end of the nineteenth century, most American states had
adopted some type of homestead protection either by statute or constitu-
tional provision.9 In addition, federal bankruptcy law recognized the
homestead by permitting a debtor to exempt property in bankruptcy to
the same extent that it was exempt under the law of the debtor's
domicile. 10
The homestead exemption enacted in the Texas Constitution of 1845
and the statutory or constitutional homestead provisions of most states
protected the homestead from the reach of general creditors. Therefore,
a creditor cannot execute upon a debtor's homestead in satisfaction of a
judgment. These provisions do not, however, limit the ability of creditors
to obtain consensual liens on a debtor's homestead to secure the payment
of a debt. Beginning with the adoption of the Texas Constitution of 1876,
Texas law did.11 Thus, Texas homeowners, unlike homeowners in other
states, could not borrow against the equity in their homes.
Since 1876, the Texas Constitution has limited the types of debts that a
Texas homestead could secure by making invalid any lien on a homestead
other than the permitted types. Until 1995, a Texas homestead could se-
cure only debts for purchase money, improvements, or taxes. 12 Minor
additions were made to the list of permitted liens in 1995,13 but home
equity loans were still not permitted. For many years there was pressure
on the Texas Legislature to amend the Constitution to permit home equ-
ity loans, but all attempts at passing a resolution consistently failed.14 Af-
ter 1986, when Congress eliminated the federal income tax deduction for
6. Actas del Congreso, Dec. 28, 1828, p. 930, Jan. 9, 1829, pp. 935-36, Jan. 10, 1829,
pp. 936-37, Jan. 12, 1829, p. 937, Jan. 13, 1829, p. 938.
7. 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 125, 126 (Austin, Gammel
Book Co. 1898).
8. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 22.
9. McKnight, Sources and Evolution, supra note 2, at 396. Most states exempt a
homeowner's equity in a homestead up to a specified value as did the 1845 Constitution. A
few states follow current Texas law in exempting a homestead defined by area rather than
value. See infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
10. See McKnight, Sources and Evolution, supra note 2, at 398. Current law permits a
debtor in bankruptcy to elect the state or federal exemption scheme unless the state has
opted out of the federal exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000). The federal scheme ex-
empts the debtor's interest in a homestead not to exceed $7500. Id. § 522(d).
11. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a) (amended 1995).
12. Id.
13. In 1995, the Constitution was amended to permit liens for an owelty of partition
and the refinance of a lien on the homestead, including a federal tax lien. TEX. CONST. art
XVI, § 50(a) (amended 1997).
14. Between 1979 and 1987, resolutions for amending the Constitution to permit home
equity loans were introduced in each legislative session, but none of the bills ever made it
out of committee in either house. House Research Org. Rep. No. 147, Special Legislative
Report: Second Mortgages and the Texas Homestead Exemption 19 (Dec. 21, 1988). In
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consumer interest 15 and made home equity loan interest deductible, 16 the
pressure increased. Finally, in 1997, the legislature passed and the voters
approved a constitutional amendment permitting home equity loans. 17
II. THE HOME EQUITY LOAN EXPERIENCE IN
OTHER STATES
A. GROWTH AND POPULARITY OF HOME EQUITY FINANCING
In the years prior to the amendment of the Texas Constitution to per-
mit home equity loans, the total amount of home equity debt grew signifi-
cantly in other states, increasing from $60 billion in 1981 to $357 billion in
1991.18 Home equity loans have been popular with borrowers and lend-
ers for a number of reasons. For some borrowers, a home equity loan
may be the only source of credit available. For other borrowers, a home
equity loan may be available at a lower interest rate than an unsecured
consumer loan or credit card advance. The deductibility of interest paid
on a home equity loan is another important advantage of a home equity
loan for borrowers. A homeowner may deduct interest paid on up to
$100,000 of home equity debt, 19 while interest on other consumer debt is
not deductible under current tax law.
Lenders have many reasons for favoring home equity loans including
the obvious advantage of having security for the loans. A borrower's
home is probably better security for a loan than other property because
of the lengths to which homeowners will go to save their homes.20 Other
benefits of home equity loans arise because of advantageous treatment
for home mortgage lenders under federal law that applies when they
make home equity loans as well as purchase money and home improve-
ment loans.21
1995, the Senate passed a resolution which would have permitted home equity loans. S.J.
Res. 25 (1996) enacted.
15. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511, 100 Stat. 2247 (repealed
1987).
16. See Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10-102, 101 Stat. 1330-382, 1330-
384 to 1330-386 (codified at I.R.C. § 163(h) (2000)).
17. TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6).
18. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Tax Policy: Many Factors Contributed to the
Growth in Home Equity Financing in the 1980s at 12, 14 (1993).
19. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(ii), (h)(3)(C)(ii) (1994).
20. In their study of individual debtors in bankruptcy, Professors Warren, Westbrook,
and Sullivan found that homeowners in bankruptcy would go to great lengths to continue
making home mortgage payments. TERRESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS: BANKRUIPFCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 134-35 (1989).
21. Federal law preempts state usury law for loans made by federally-related lenders
and secured by a first lien on residential real estate. See 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000)
(Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980). Therefore, a
home equity lender may avoid state usury limitations by requiring a homeowner to pay off
existing liens on the home with the proceeds of the home equity loan. Federal law also
preempts state laws that restrict alternative mortgage financing arrangements such as loans
with variable interest rates, balloon payments, or negative amortization. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 3803 (2000) (Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act).
Bankruptcy law also treats home equity loans favorably. In a Chapter 7 liquidation,
secured lenders are paid the full amount of their claims or are entitled to the property
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For borrowers, there are disadvantages to a home equity loan as well as
advantages. The obvious disadvantage is the risk of loss of the home in
the event of default. A home equity loan is particularly disadvantageous
in bankruptcy as compared to unsecured debt or debt secured by prop-
erty other than the homestead.22 Finally, not all home equity loans have
a low interest rate. Some poor, minority, and elderly homeowners pay
outrageously high interest rates and fees on certain home equity loans
that consumer advocates have labeled "predatory loans. ' 23
B. THE PREDATORY LENDING PROBLEM
Predatory loans are characterized by high interest rates and points that
exceed the amount necessary to cover the lender's risk, 24 excessive fees
and closing costs that are usually financed as part of the loan,25 frequent
refinancing or loan flipping with additional points and fees, 26 and outright
fraud. 27 Borrowers are often required to refinance low interest rate
itself. In addition, long term loans secured by the debtor's principal residence cannot be
modified in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 as can unsecured loans or loans secured by property
other than the debtor's home. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2) (1994).
22. A debtor in Chapter 7 can discharge an unsecured loan but cannot retain a home
without paying home mortgage debt in full. In Chapter 13, a loan secured by property
other than the debtor's home can be modified, and if the loan is undersecured, the lien can
be striped down to the value of the property. Id. § 1322(b)(2). However, a debtor with a
long term home equity loan must pay the loan in full on its original terms in order to retain
possession of the home.
23. See Forrester, Home Equity Financing, supra note 1, at 387-92.
24. See Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearings on Predatory Mort-
gage Lending] 2001 WL 857919 (statement of David Berrenbaum, Nat'l Community Rein-
vestment Coalition), 2001 WL 857910 (statement of Esther Canja, President, AARP);
Adding Injury to Injury: Credit on the Fringe: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Credit and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong. 16 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearing on Credit] (statement of Bruce Marks, Execu-
tive Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corp.). These homeowners may pay inter-
est rates as high 39% per annum. Jack Meyers et al., Firm Wrote Loans at 39% Interest,
BOSTON HERALD, June 17, 1991, at 1, 20. They may pay points totaling as much as 33
percent of the amount financed. Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage
Lending Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 447 (1993) [herein-
after 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending] (letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing
Att'y, St. Ambrose Legal Servs., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993)).
25. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857948
(statement of Irv Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 2001 WL 857911 (statement of
John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n); Mortgage Lending Abuses: Hearing Before
the House Banking and Financial Services Comm., 106th Cong. 12 (2000) [hereinafter
Hearing on Mortgage Lending Abuses] (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for
Domestic Finance, Dep't of Treasury).
26. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857948
(statement of Irv Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 2001 WL 857911 (statement of
John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n), 2001 WL 857907 (statement of Judith A. Ken-
nedy, Nat'l Ass'n of Affordable Housing Lenders); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Abuses,
supra note 25, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance,
Dep't of Treasury).
27. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857940
(statement of Jeffrey Zeltzer, National Home Equity Mortgage Association), 2001 WL
857910 (statement of Esther Canja, President, AARP), 2001 WL 857911 (statement of
2002]
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purchase money loans as part of the new higher interest rate home equity
loan. 28 When a borrower has difficulty making payments on the preda-
tory loan, the lender may encourage refinancing of the debt with a larger
loan carrying a higher interest rate and requiring higher monthly pay-
ments and payment of additional points and closing costs. 2 9 Borrowers
rarely obtain any benefit from a loan flip other than postponing a foreclo-
sure, and they end up owing more after having paid additional points and
fees to the same or another predatory lender. Predatory loans may also
have other unfair terms such as high prepayment fees, balloon payments,
and required credit insurance. 30 Fraudulent practices include falsifying
loan applications, forging borrowers signatures, changing loan terms at
closing, misrepresenting loan terms, physically obscuring key terms, and
having borrowers sign documents with key terms left blank.31 In many
cases, lenders make the loans without regard to the borrowers' ability to
repay.32
Predatory lending can be distinguished from subprime lending. Sub-
prime lenders are those that serve higher risk borrowers and thus charge
higher rates than prime lenders.33 Not all subprime loans are predatory,
although predatory loans are almost always subprime. 34 Most predatory
loans are either home equity loans or home improvement loans.35
The targets of predatory lenders are most often minorities, the elderly,
and the inner-city and rural poor.36 Borrowers from predatory lenders
John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Abuses, supra
note 25, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dep't of
Treasury).
28. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857948
(statement of Irv Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services); 1993 Hearings on Problems in
Lending, supra note 24, at 447 (letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Att'y, St. Am-
brose Legal Servs., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993)).
29. See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 24, at 447.
30. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857923
(statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.), 2001 WL 857919
(statement of David Berenbaum, Nat'l Community Reinvestment Coalition).
31. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857919,
(statement of David Berenbaum, Nat'l Community Reinvestment Coalition); 1993 Hear-
ings on Problems in Lending, supra note 24, at 309 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att'y
General, Commonwealth of Mass.).
32. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857948
(statement of Irv Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 2001 WL 857919 (statement of
David Berenbaum, Nat'l Community Reinvestment Coalition).
33. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857911
(statement of John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n), 2001 WL 857919 (statement of
David Berenbaum, Nat'l Community Reinvestment Coalition).
34. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857911
(statement of John A. Courson), 2001 WL 857919 (statement of David Berenbaum, Nat'l
Community Reinvestment Coalition), 2001 WL 857923 (statement of Mike Shea, Execu-
tive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.).
35. In recent years, however, subprime lenders have also entered the purchase money
loan market. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL
857923 (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.) (making
6.6% of conventional home purchase money loans in 1999, up from 1% in 1993).
36. See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Abuses, supra note 25, at 12 (statement of Gary
Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dep't of Treasury), at 20 (statement of
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usually have substantial equity in their homes due to rising real estate
values or to reduction of purchase money debt, but are short on cash
because of their low or fixed incomes. 37 They may need money to make
home repairs or improvements, to pay for necessities such as medical
care, or to consolidate household debts.38 The elderly are particularly vul-
nerable because they typically have a great deal of equity in homes that
they have owned for many years and because they are likely to be on
fixed incomes. 39
Perpetrators of predatory lending practices include lenders, mortgage
brokers, and home improvement contractors. 40 These parties seek out
particularly vulnerable homeowners on whom to prey.41 Upon finding a
likely prospect, a lender, broker, or contractor may use high pressure tac-
tics or fraud to induce the homeowner to enter into an abusive loan trans-
action. 42 Using unscrupulous and often illegal tactics, lenders may induce
unsophisticated borrowers to enter into loan transactions with payments
larger than their incomes can support.43
Predatory lenders have been accused of making loans designed to fail
so that the lenders can take title to borrowers' homes through foreclo-
sure.44 These lenders often make loans without regard to the borrower's
ability to repay, relying instead on the borrower's equity in the home to
Donna Tanoue, Chairwoman, FDIC); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note
24, at 254 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att'y General, Commonwealth of Mass.), 257
(statement of Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.).
37. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE COMMU-
NITY DEVELOPMENT, CREDIT ENHANCEMENT, AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF
1993, S. REP. No. 169, 103d Cong., 22 (1993).
38. See id.; 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 24, at 449 (letter from
William E. Morris, Director of Litig., S. Ariz. Legal Aid, to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr.
(Feb. 18, 1973)).
39. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857910
(statement of Esther Canja, President, AARP); ROBERT J. HOBBS ET AL., NATIONAL CON-
SUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER PROBLEMS WlI-H HOME EQUITY SCAMS, SECOND MORT-
GAGES, AND HOME EQuIrY LINES OF CREDIT 9 (Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons 1989).
40. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857944
(statement of Consumer Bankers Ass'n); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Abuses, supra
note 25, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dep't of
Treasury).
41. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 849991
(statement of Leroy Williams, private citizen). They may check foreclosure notices to find
financially troubled homeowners or may cruise certain neighborhoods looking for homes
in need of repair. See Mike Hudson, Stealing Home: How the Government and Big Banks
Help Second-Mortgage Companies Prey on the Poor, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1476, 1479
(1993).
42. See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 24, at 309 (statement of
Scott Harshbarger, Att'y General, Commonwealth of Mass.).
43. See 1993 Hearing on Credit, supra note 24, at 8-10 (statement of Richard F. Syron,
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston).
44. See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 24, at 254 (statement of
Scott Harshbarger, Att'y General of the Commonwealth of Mass.); 60 Minutes: A Matter of
Interest (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 15, 1992); see also HOBBS ET AL., supra note 39, at
38 ("Initially, it appeared that the equity skimmers were most interested in obtaining a




secure the loan, 45 an underwriting practice clearly inappropriate for home
mortgage lending.46 This practice sets up the borrower for ultimate fail-
ure and loss of the home to foreclosure, but the lenders profit regardless.
If the homeowner makes payments, the lender reaps an enormous profit
based on the exorbitant interest rates. If the homeowner cannot pay, the
lender gets the equity in the house through foreclosure.47 Even if the
borrower prepays the loan by refinancing, the lender profits from a pre-
payment penalty, which most predatory loans have.48
In 1994 in response to the problem of predatory lending, Congress en-
acted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 49 which requires
additional disclosures and prohibits certain unfair terms in connection
with mortgages with interest rates or points and fees above the threshold
set forth in the statute.50 Some states have also adopted statutory or reg-
ulatory schemes designed to address the predatory lending problem. 5'
However, the problem persists. In fact, according to consumer advocates,
the incidence of predatory loans has increased since 1994.52
Until 1998 when home equity loans became available, Texas homeown-
ers were protected from predatory lenders except in the context of preda-
tory home improvement loans. Now Texas homeowners can obtain home
equity loans. However, many of the provisions of the constitutional
amendment permitting home equity loans were designed to address the
predatory lending problems that borrowers have faced in other states.
45. See 1993 Hearing on Credit, supra note 24, at 16 (testimony of Bruce Marks, Exec-
utive Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corp.). In fact, some cases have been doc-
umented in which monthly payments on a home equity loan exceeded the borrower's
monthly income. See, e.g., 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 24, at 260
(statement of Terry Drent, Ann Arbor Community Dev. Dep't) (discussing monthly pay-
ments of $250 required of a borrower with a monthly income of $220), 292 (statement of
Eva Davis, Resident, San Francisco) (discussing approximate monthly payments of $2,000
required of a borrower with a monthly income of under $1,100); Gary Chafetz & Peter S.
Canellos, Elderly Poor Losing Homes in Loan Scam: Unregulated Lenders Offer High
Rates, Risks, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1991, at 1, 6 (discussing monthly payments of $2,062
required of a borrower with a monthly income of about $800).
46. See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 24, at 257 (statement of
Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.); HoBBs ET AL., supra note 39, at 12.
47. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857948
(statement of Irv Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services).
48. See id.
49. Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1648).
50. HOEPA applies to mortgages with an annual percentage rate more than ten per-
centage points greater than the rate on a Treasury security of comparable maturity or with
points and fees exceeding the greater of 8% of the loan amount or $400. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(aa).
51. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 241.1E (1999); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-i (McKinney
2001).
52. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857923
(statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.). Subprime lending
increased 900% between 1993 and 1999. Id. at 2001 WL 857923 (statement of Mike Shea,
Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.), 2001 WL 85791.9 (statement of David Ber-
enbaum, Nat'l Community Reinvestment Coalition) ("increased almost 1000 percent from
1993-1998").
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The constitutional amendment permitting home equity loans lists
twenty-six requirements for a valid lien on the homestead, which are for
the most part measures designed to protect homeowners from unscrupu-
lous lenders or from the consequences of a bad decision.5 3 The constitu-
tional requirements include limitations on the amount of the loan, the
security for the loan, fees that may be charged, and the lender's available
remedies. In addition, the constitutional amendment requires notices and
waiting periods and prohibits certain unfair or coercive practices by
lenders.
A home equity loan may not cause the total debt secured by a home-
stead to exceed eighty percent of the fair market value of the home-
stead.54 Therefore, the amount of the home equity loan when added to
the total balances of all other debts secured by the home may not exceed
eighty percent of the fair market value. Although this provision limits the
ability of homeowners to reach all of the equity in their homes, it substan-
tially reduces the risk of loss. A high loan-to-value ratio is one of the
most significant factors in determining the risk of mortgage delinquency
or foreclosure. 55 Therefore, home equity loans with a lower overall loan
to value ratio are less likely to become delinquent or lead to foreclosure.
Thus, by limiting the amount that homeowners can borrow against their
homes, this provision retains some of the paternalistic protection of the
pre-amendment constitutional provision that prohibited home equity
loans altogether.
A home equity loan must be a nonrecourse loan56 and may not be se-
cured by any collateral, either real or personal, other than the home-
stead.57 As a result, the lender's only recourse upon default is foreclosure
of the lien on the borrower's home. The borrower cannot face a defi-
ciency judgment or the loss of any property other than the home. The
53. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6).
54. Id. § 50(a)(6)(B). The parties are required to execute a written acknowledgment
of the fair market value for the home on the date the loan is made. Id. § 50(a)(6)(Q)(ix).
The lender is entitled to conclusively rely on the acknowledgment if the value is based on
an appraisal conducted in accordance with state or federal requirements applicable to
home equity loans and the lender does not have actual knowledge that it is incorrect. Id.
§ 50(h).
55. See JOHN P. HERZOG & JAMES S. EARLEY, HOME MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND
FORECLOSURE at xvii-xix (1970); Robert J. Aalberts & Douglas S. Bible, Mortgage Default
in Louisiana: An Empirical Study of Recent Foreclosures on Residential Property in Caddo
Parish, 15 S.U. L. REV. 215, 219 (1988); Tim S. Campbell & J. Kimball Dietrich, The Deter-
minants of Default on Insured Conventional Residential Mortgage Loans, 38 J. FIN. 1569,
1580 (1983); George M. von Furstenberg & R. Jeffrey Green, Estimation of Delinquency
Risk for Home Mortgage Portfolios, 2 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N J. 5, 12 (1974);
Jerry R. Jackson & David L. Kasserman, Default Risk on Home Mortgage Loans: A Test of
Competing Hypotheses, 47 J. RISK & INS. 678, 686 (1980).
56. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(C).
57. Id. § 50(a)(6)(H). These two provisions together are particularly onerous for lend-
ers, especially since a lender's failure to comply with constitutional requirements will inval-
idate the lien. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83.
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lender, thus, takes the risk that the value of the property may fall below
the amount of the debt encumbering it.
If a lender does foreclose on a home equity borrower's home, the fore-
closure may occur only after a judicial proceeding. 58 Therefore, unlike
other types of real estate loans in Texas, power of sale foreclosure with-
out judicial intervention is not available. The opportunity for a hearing
required by the constitution gives home equity borrowers the opportunity
to raise facts relating to the lender's compliance with constitutional re-
quirements or other defenses. If a home equity lender could foreclose by
power of sale, the only means for a homeowner to assert a defense to
foreclosure would be to bring suit to enjoin the foreclosure. The burden
to initiate litigation creates a major obstacle for homeowners for several
reasons. 59 First, consumers tend not to assert their legal rights when do-
ing so requires them to initiate litigation. 60 In addition, the costs of initi-
ating litigation may be prohibitive. 61 Finally, the nature of the injunction
action makes it a difficult and expensive suit for a homeowner to file.62
Therefore, the requirement that gives a homeowner the opportunity for a
hearing before foreclosure of a home equity loan provides significant pro-
tection and is particularly important where there is a likelihood of de-
fenses to foreclosure created by predatory lending practices.63
While the constitutional amendment does not contain any limitation on
58. Id. § 50(a)(6)(D). The Texas Supreme Court has promulgated rules of civil proce-
dure for expedited foreclosure proceedings for home equity loans. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 735,
736. Rule 736 provides a procedure for obtaining a court order that permits foreclosure
pursuant to the power of sale foreclosure provisions of the Property Code. TEx. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1995).
59. See Forrester, Home Improvement Financing, supra note 1, at 1129-31.
60. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer
Payments, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 63, 81, 116 (1987). Homeowners may not be sufficiently so-
phisticated to know that a valid defense will prevent a foreclosure, id., or they may be
cynical about their own ability to prevail against the foreclosing lender, James J. White,
The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wisc. L. REV.
503, 528. In addition, they may be intimidated by the legal process or by the prospect of
hiring an attorney. See Cooter & Rubin, supra, at 81, 116.
61. Although the poor have access to free legal services in many communities, low
income homeowners may have incomes too great to qualify for such services. See Income
Level for Individuals Eligible for Assistance, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,082 (2001).
62. To prevent a pending power of sale foreclosure, a homeowner must obtain a tem-
porary restraining order (TRO), a preliminary injunction, or both. In addition, the home-
owner must ultimately obtain a permanent injunction. Most jurisdictions require a plaintiff
seeking either a TRO or a preliminary injunction to post a bond or other security. DAN B
DorBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.11(3) (2d ed. 1993). In order to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion or TRO, the homeowner must typically show irreparable harm and some probability
that the homeowner will prevail on the merits. See id. § 2.11(2). While a TRO may be
issued in an ex parte hearing, its typical duration is only ten days to two weeks. Id.
§ 2.11(1). A preliminary injunction usually will be required to prevent a lender from fore-
closing after expiration of the TRO and before a permanent injunction can be obtained.
Securing a preliminary injunction requires an evidentiary hearing. Id. In an action to ob-
tain a permanent injunction, the homeowner must prove a valid defense to the debt.
63. See Forrester, Home Improvement Financing, supra note 1, at 1132-33 (discussing
why a judicial hearing should be required to foreclose certain home improvement loans
where defenses are particularly likely).
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interest rates,64 it does limit the amount of fees that may be charged. The
amendment limits fees to no more than three percent of the original prin-
cipal amount of the loan, 65 but is not entirely clear in delineating which
fees are included within the limitation.66 Despite the questions raised by
the limitation, it has been effective to reduce fees paid by Texas home
equity borrowers. 67
With respect to payment terms, a home equity loan must be fully amor-
tized 68and must be fully prepayable without penalty or charge. 69 Early
balloon payments are thus prohibited as well as prepayment premiums,
which are common in predatory loans but not in other home mortgage
loans. Open-ended accounts are also prohibited.70 Therefore, home eq-
uity secured credit cards, popular in other states, are not permitted in
Texas. In recent years, consumer advocates have observed predatory
practices in connection with open-ended home equity loans.71
The constitutional amendment requires that the borrower be provided
with a copy of a prescribed notice, which includes the list of constitutional
requirements for a home equity loan, restated in plain language. 72 Thus,
homeowners have the information necessary to raise defenses to foreclo-
sure if a lender has failed to meet the constitutional requirements. The
loan may not close until the twelfth day after the notice is given,73 and the
loan must be closed in the office of the lender, an attorney, or a title
64. TEX. CONs'r. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(O).
65. Id. § 50(a)(6)(E).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 100-105.
67. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Home Equity Lending Law Defies Critics, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 1998, at H7.
68. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(L).
69. Id. § 50(a)(6)(G).
70. Id. § 50(a)(6)(F). An open-end account is statutorily defined as:
an account under a written contract between a creditor and an obligor in
connection with which:
(i) the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions and the obli-
gor is authorized to make purchases or borrow money;
(ii) interest... may be charged from time to time on an outstanding unpaid
balance; and
(iii) the amount of credit that may be extended during the term of the ac-
count is generally made available to the extent that any outstanding bal-
ance is repaid ...
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002 (West Suppi' ,2001). Revolving credit home equity loans,
under which the borrower repeatedly repays principal and borrows again up to the loan
amount or credit limit, are prohibited. Closed-end loans are permitted, and closed-end
loans with multiple advances should be permitted. A loan is a closed-end loan even if
advances are made at particular stages after the initial closing and interest is charged only
upon the outstanding principal balance. The distinction is that under a closed-end loan,
credit may not be made available to the extent that outstanding balances have already
been repaid.
71. See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 24, 2001 WL 857948
(statement of Irv Ackelsberg, Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services).
72. TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50(g). The notice essentially sets forth the constitutional
requirements; however, discrepancies exist between the requirements and the language of
the notice. See infra text accompanying notes 106-107 and 138-142.
73. TEX. CONST., art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M).
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company.74 These provisions protect homeowners against high-pressure
door-to-door solicitation of home equity loans since homeowners must
wait some period of time before the closing and the loan cannot be closed
in the borrower's home. In addition, the homeowner and spouse have a
right to rescind the loan for three days after closing.75
The constitution also prohibits a number of deceptive and coercive
practices. The lender may not require the homeowner to sign loan docu-
ments with blanks not filled in,76 a practice common in predatory loans.
In addition, the lender may not require the homeowner to apply home
equity loan proceeds to certain other debt owed to the same lender,77 so
lenders may not pressure homeowners to convert unsecured debt held by
that lender to home equity debt. A homeowner may have only one home
equity loan at a time 78 and may not refinance a home equity loan or ob-
tain a new one more frequently than once a year. 79 These two provisions
discourage loan flipping-the practice by lenders of repeatedly refinanc-
ing home equity loans, increasing the loans, or making new loans in order
to obtain additional fees.
Under the homestead provision of the Texas Constitution, a valid lien
cannot encumber a homestead unless it secures a debt described in the
constitution.80 A loan meeting all of the constitutional requirements for a
home equity loan is a debt that may encumber a homestead.8t If a lender
makes a home equity loan but fails to comply with any of the constitu-
tional requirements for a home equity loan, however, the attempted lien
on the homestead will not be valid. Since a home equity loan must be
nonrecourse and may not be secured by other property, the lender will be
left with an unsecured nonrecourse loan. The constitution further pro-
vides that the lender forfeits all principal and interest of the loan if the
lender fails to comply with any of the constitutional requirements within
a reasonable time after the borrower notifies the lender of the problem.8 2
Therefore, the consequences of a defect that is not cured are quite
severe.
83
74. Id. § 50(a)(6)(N).
75. Id. § 50(a)(6)(Q)(viii). If the third day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, then
the period for rescission is extended to the next business day. See TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN.
§ 311.014 (West 1988). The federal Truth in Lending Act gives a homeowner the right to
rescind a home equity loan for three business days following the later of the closing of the
loan or the delivery of the rescission notice and other disclosure required under the Act.
15 U.S.C. §1635(a), (e) (2000).
76. TEX. CoNsTi. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(iii).
77. Id. § 50(a)(6)(Q)(i). See infra text accompanying notes 139-42.
78. TEX. CONSTI. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(K).
79. Id. § 50(a)(6)(M)(ii).
80. Id. § 50(c).
81. Id. § 50(a)(6).
82. Id. § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x).
83. It was unclear whether the lender only avoided forfeiture of principal and interest,
or whether an invalid lien could be made valid by the lender's corrective action under this
section, but the Texas Supreme Court recently answered this question. See Doody v.
Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 49 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 2001), discussed infra notes 143-148 and
accompanying text.
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Finally, the constitutional amendment provides that the constitutional
requirements for a home equity loan are not severable.84 If any of the
provisions are held to be preempted by federal law, the entire amend-
ment is invalid. 85 As a result, if any one of the constitutional require-
ments is held to be preempted, the entire home equity loan provision will
fail, and home equity loans will once again be prohibited in Texas.
IV. CRITICISM
Lenders and commentators have criticized the constitutional amend-
ment permitting home equity loans,8 6 with criticism falling roughly into
three categories. First are objections to the placement of the entire home
equity loan scheme in the constitution with the attendant problems of
amendment and interpretation. These objections are valid. Second are
criticisms of the amendment's language which has raised ambiguities and
uncertainties. At least some of these criticisms are legitimate. Finally,
critics have challenged the basic consumer protection philosophy of the
scheme. Based on the experience of homeowners in other states, this ob-
jection is not legitimate. I will discuss each category of criticism.
A. PLACEMENT IN THE CONSTITUTION
Critics of Texas home equity lending law have objected to the place-
ment of the provision in the state constitution. 87 This problem originated
in 1845, when limitations on the ability to create a lien were first placed in
the Texas Constitution rather than adopted by statute. 88 However, the
75th Legislature continued this questionable tradition by placing every
detail of the state's home equity lien law in the constitution rather than
by enabling home equity loans by reference to statute. As a result, Texas
law regulating home equity loans cannot be amended except by constitu-
tional amendment, which requires a joint resolution favored by a
supermajority of both houses and approval by a majority of the voters.89
84. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(j)
85. Id.
86. See J. Alton Alsup, Pitfalls (And Pratfalls) of Texas Home Equity Lending, 52
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 437 (1998); Charles C. Boettcher, Taking Texas Home Equity
for a Walk, But Keeping It on a Short Leash!, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 197 (1999); Mark D.
Morris, Implementing a Texas Home Equity Lending Program-Documentation and Opera-
tional Issues, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 471 (1998); Lawrence A. Young, Texas Home
Equity Lending-On the Horizon at Last, But with Storm Clouds Rising, 51 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 336 (1997); Patton L. Zarate, An Ailing System: Possible Solutions for Curing the
Texas Home Equity Loan Amendment, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 461 (2000); Patrick Barta, Lend-
ers Seek to Clarify Lending Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1998, at T1; Robert Elder, Jr.,
Lawmakers Tinker with Loan Law, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1999, at T1; Earl Golz, Looking
for Equity: Lenders, Borrowers Both Have Problems with State Law, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 20, 1998, at J1; Ann Graham, Home Equity Update, TEX. BANK-
ING, May 1, 2000, at 48; Jack Hams, Forging Ahead in the Brave New World of Home
Equity Lending, TEX. BANKING, Sept. 1, 1998, at 32.
87. See Morris, supra note 86, at 471; Zarate, supra note 86, at 501-02.
88. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
89. TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
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This difficulty of amendment is particularly problematic because of the
detailed nature of the consumer protection measures in the constitution.
Even small issues or ambiguities, which can arise in a complicated statu-
tory scheme, can only be clarified or changed by constitutional amend-
ment or resolved by the courts.
In addition, the amendment does not give administrative authority to
any agency to interpret any ambiguities or uncertainties.90 While the
constitutional amendment is quite detailed, not every provision within it
is entirely clear. 91 In an attempt to clarify the provisions of the amend-
ment, the Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner, the Texas Depart-
ment of Banking, the Texas Savings and Loan Department, and the Texas
Credit Union Department issued a Regulatory Commentary on Equity
Lending Procedures. 92 The agencies that issued the Commentary are re-
sponsible for regulating entities making home equity loans. The Com-
mentary is designed to be used in examination and enforcement
situations by these agencies, but it is not binding on courts resolving dis-
putes between borrowers and lenders.93 The constitution could be
amended to give regulatory authority to construe the provision, but ac-
cording to an Attorney General's Opinion, the legislature may not au-
thorize a state agency to interpret the constitution. 94 Therefore, without
another constitutional amendment, the legislature may not give power to
an agency to interpret the home equity loan amendment.
B. LANGUAGE OF THE AMENDMENT
Other criticisms of the constitutional amendment are based on ambigu-
ities and uncertainties within the amendment itself. For example, early
criticism focused on the inability of homeowners to obtain home equity
loans secured by urban homes situated on more than one acre. 95 Prior to
1999, the Texas Constitution limited the size of an urban homestead to
one acre. 96 Because a lender is prohibited from taking collateral other
than the homestead to secure a home equity loan,97 a homeowner with
more than one acre would be required to designate which acre was the
homestead and thus the security for the home equity loan. If the lender
ever foreclosed on the one acre homestead, however, the lender might
violate subdivision requirements, zoning ordinances, or restrictive cove-
90. See Zarate, supra note 86, at 501-04; Barta, supra note 86, at T1.
91. See infra subpart B.
92. Office of the Consumer Credit Commissioner, Regulatory Commentary on Equity
Lending Procedures (Oct. 1998) [hereinafter Regulatory Commentary].
93. Regulatory Commentary, supra note 92, at 1. However, the Texas Supreme Court
has cited the Commentary and agreed with it. Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 23
S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. 2000).
94. Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. DM-495 (1998).
95. See Alsup, supra note 86, at 445-48; Boettcher, supra note 86, at 252-54; Zarate,
supra note 86, at 493-501; Barta, supra note 86, at T1.
96. TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 51 (amended 1999).
97. TEX. CONSTr. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(H).
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nants.98 As a result, homeowners with homes situated on more than one
acre were not, as a practical matter, able to obtain home equity loans.
The legislature addressed this problem in its 1999 legislative session as
discussed below.99
Another widely criticized provision of the amendment is the three per-
cent cap on fees.100 The provision specifically excludes interest but other-
wise does not make clear which fees are included within the cap and
which are not. Some critics have questioned whether discount points are
included within the cap, 101 although the Commentary, consistent with nu-
merous court opinions interpreting state usury law, provides that points
are interest and are thus excluded from the limitation.'0 2 Another issue
is the extent to which insurance premiums of various types are included
within the cap.10 3 Also at issue is whether fees charged after the incep-
tion of the loan, such as late fees, returned check charges, collection costs,
and foreclosure costs would be included.' 04 As I will discuss, courts have
now addressed some of the issues raised by the fee cap. 10 5
Another criticism of the constitutional amendment is that discrepancies
exist between the constitutional requirements and the constitutionally
mandated notice to home equity borrowers.' 0 6 The Texas Supreme Court
addressed this inconsistency, determining that the requirements control
over the notice. 10 7
Critics and attorneys have raised other ambiguities and uncertainties in
the amendment, some of which are valid concerns' 0 8 and others of which
strain the language of the constitution or border on the ridiculous.' 0 9 The
98. See Boettcher, supra note 86, at 253; Zarate, supra note 86, at 497-98.
99. See infra subpart V.A.
100. See Alsup, supra note 86, at 442-45; Boettcher, supra note 86, at 254-57; Zarate,
supra note 86, at 486-93; Barta, supra note 86, at T1; Hams, supra note 86, at 32.
101. See Alsup, supra note 86, at 444; Zarate, supra note 86, at 488-90.
102. See Regulatory Commentary, supra note 92, at 3.
103. See Alsup, supra note 86, at 444; Boettcher, supra note 86, at 255. The Commen-
tary takes the position that title insurance and mortgage insurance premiums are included
while life insurance, health insurance and casualty insurance are not. Regulatory Com-
mentary, supra note 92, at 3-4.
104. See Alsup, supra note 86, at 443; Zarate, supra note 86, at 492-93. The Commen-
tary takes the position that they are not within the fee cap. Regulatory Commentary, supra
note 92, at 4.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 149-53.
106. See Morris, supra note 86, at 480-81. The notice restates the constitutional require-
ments in plain language but with some discrepancies. See supra text accompanying note
72.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 138-42.
108. See, e.g., Alsup, supra note 86, at 448-52 (ambiguity in list of authorized lenders);
Boettcher, supra note 86, at 257 (meaning of "reasonable time"), 258 (whether twelve-day
cooling off period requires twelve business days).
109. The plaintiff in one case argued that the payment of points at the time of loan
origination, if points were interest, violated the constitutional requirement that the loan be
"scheduled to be repaid in substantially equal successive monthly installments." Tarver v.
Sebring Capital Credit Corp., No. 10-00-394-CV, 2002 WL 122743 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002)
(quoting TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(L)). The court did not address this issue on
appeal. Id. at *4. In another case, the plaintiff argued that a severability provision in the
deed of trust securing a home equity loan violated the non-severability provision of the
20021
SMU LAW REVIEW
courts have resolved some of these issues" and will presumably address
the others at some point if the legislature does not.
C. CONSUMER PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY
In addition to raising ambiguities in the constitutional amendment,
lenders and some commentators have criticized the extensive consumer
protection measures of the amendment.'11 Lenders feel that the con-
sumer protections are too stringent and have made home equity lending
too risky for lenders.1 12 Critics have expressed concern that small lend-
ing institutions cannot make home equity loans because of the restrictive
nature of the provision,1 3 and have further suggested that secondary
market investors such as Fannie Mae will not purchase Texas home equity
loans.'1 4 In addition, some critics have asserted that the consumer pro-
tections limit the freedom of consumers to obtain home equity loans to
too great an extent." 5
Despite the concerns that lenders have expressed about the consumer
protection provisions, they are in fact making home equity loans in
Texas. 1 6 Although many small lenders have not entered the home equity
loan market, 1 7 some have.1 8 It remains to be seen whether additional
small lenders will make home equity loans as more of the questions
constitutional amendment. Edwards v. Option One Mortgage Corp., Nos. 00-51058-RBK,
00-5055-RBK, 2001 WL 708827 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001). The court held that section 500)
of the constitutional amendment does not prohibit a severability clause in loan documents,
but provides that the provisions of the statute are not severable. Id. at *3. Finally, a plain-
tiff raised a number of issues including that the term "title company" is unconstitutionally
vague, that the requirement that the loan be closed in the office of a lender, attorney or
title company violates the borrower's right to travel under the federal Constitution, and
that the requirement that both spouses sign loan documents violates the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act. Rooms with a View, Inc. v. Private Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 7 S.W.3d 840,
844, 847, 849 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999). These issues were raised with respect to the home
improvement loan provision of the Texas Constitution, but would be equally applicable to
home equity loans. The court found none of the plaintiff's arguments to be convincing and
affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 851.
110. See supra note 109.
111. See Boettcher, supra note 86, at 260-66; Elder, supra note 86, at T1; Golz, supra
note 86, at JI; Graham, supra note 86, at 48; Hams, supra note 86, at 32; Oppel, supra note
67, at H1.
112. See Elder, supra note 86, at T1; Golz, supra note 86, at J1; Graham, supra note 86,
at 48; Hams, supra note 86, at 32; Oppel, supra note 67, at H1. Lenders were particularly
concerned with the judicial foreclosure requirement and the lack of personal liability.
Hams, supra note 86, at 32.
113. See Boettcher, supra note 86, at 263-66; Graham, supra note 86, at 48.
114. See Alsup, supra note 86, at 469-70.
115. See Boettcher, supra note 86, at 260-63; Oppel, supra note 67, at H1.
116. See Golz, supra note 86, at J1 ($11 billion to $12 billion in originations for 1998
with an expected $20 billion on the books within four years); Oppel, supra note 67, at H1
($6 billion or more expected to be loaned in 1998 with a predicted market of more than $25
billion by 2001).
117. See Graham, supra note 86, at 48; Hams, supra note 86, at 32; Oppel, supra note
67, at H1; John Reosti, Home Equity Too Risky for Small Texas Banks, AM. BANKER, Feb.
21, 2001, at 6.
118. See Hams, supra note 86, at 32; Oppel, supra note 67, at H1; Two Years After Ban
Is Lifted, 58 Texas Credit Unions Offering HELCs, CREDIT UNION J., Mar. 19, 2001, at 3.
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raised by the amendment are answered. In addition, Fannie Mae is com-
mitted to purchasing Texas home equity loans, 119 so concerns that secon-
dary lenders would not purchase Texas home equity loans appear to be
misplaced.
From the consumer's point of view, the constitutional amendment does
in fact limit the amount and terms of a home equity loan. Consumers
who wish to borrow against all of the equity in their homes cannot do so,
and they cannot borrow on a revolving credit basis. Most consumer pro-
tection law limits the freedom of consumers to some extent. Thus, the
issue is not whether limitations exist, but whether they are necessary.
Based on the experience of consumers in other states who have been vic-
timized by predatory lenders, the limitations are necessary. In addition,
the consumer protection measures have not stifled demand for home eq-
uity loans as critics had feared.12 0 Despite the numerous restrictions,
lenders are making home equity loans in Texas, homeowners are borrow-
ing, and borrowers are saving money on fees because of the constitutional
cap on fees. 121 Thus, much of the criticism of the restrictions and limita-
tions is unwarranted.
As discussed above, however, the amendment does have some ambigu-
ities and uncertainties that must be addressed by the courts and the legis-
lature. 122 The Texas Legislature has met twice since the passage of the
original constitutional amendment, with little change resulting, and cases
are gradually winding through the courts.
V. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
A. LEGISLATIVE REACTION
The legislature addressed only the one acre problem in its 76th session
in 1999, adopting a resolution for a constitutional amendment increasing
the size of the urban homestead from one to ten acres. 123 Texas voters
approved the amendment, and now Texas homeowners may protect
homes located on up to ten acres of property from the reach of general
creditors. The intended result of this amendment was to permit home-
owners with one to ten acre homesteads to obtain home equity loans, but
the effect of the amendment is much broader. At a time when Texas
members of Congress are struggling to maintain the right of Texans to
preserve their homesteads in a bankruptcy proceeding, increasing the ex-
emption was hardly a wise move.
Texas is among the states most protective of the home as against credi-
tors. Only a few other states define the homestead by area rather than
value, thereby exempting a home from the reach of creditors regardless
119. See Fannie Mae Supports Equity Lending in Texas, TEX. BANKING, Jan. 1, 1998, at
18.
120. Oppel, supra note 67, at Hi.
121. Id.
122. See supra subpart B.
123. See Tex. S.J. Res. 22, 76th Leg., R.S., 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1510.
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of its value. 124 Most states permit equity in a homestead up to a desig-
nated value, in some cases as low as $2500, to be protected from the reach
of creditors. 125 The Bankruptcy Code currently permits debtors in bank-
ruptcy to elect either federal or state exemptions. 126 Debtors in Texas
almost exclusively choose state exemptions because they are so much
more generous than the federal exemptions provided by the Bankruptcy
Code.
In 1997, the Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended in its re-
port that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to place a floor and ceiling
on the state homestead exemption that a debtor in bankruptcy may ex-
empt. 127 The Commission felt that the lack of homestead protection in
some states was inconsistent with the fresh start policy of bankruptcy as
well as federal policy promoting home ownership. 128 On the other hand,
the Commission felt that an unlimited homestead exemption violated the
goal in bankruptcy of distributing assets among creditors. 129 Therefore,
the Commission recommended the retention of state exemptions but with
limitation to a designated range. Adoption of the Commission's proposal
would have the effect of reducing the homestead exemption that Texas
debtors could claim in bankruptcy from an unlimited exemption of an
urban homestead of ten acres or less to an exemption of no more than
$100,000.130
Since the Commission's report was issued, Congress has considered
bankruptcy reform legislation that would address, among other issues, the
homestead exemption. 13' Many of the bills have adopted limits on the
value of a homestead that may be exempted in bankruptcy. 132 Texas
members of Congress have worked each time to preserve the Texas
homestead exemption against criticism in Congress that it is too gener-
ous. 1 33 No reforms have yet been enacted, but legislation remains
124. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Final Report, Bankruptcy: The Next
Twenty Years, 1 N.B.R.C. Rep. 1 (October 20, 1997).
125. Id.
126. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994).
127. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, supra note 124, at 2. Congress estab-
lished the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to study issues relating to bankruptcy,
to solicit different views, to evaluate proposals, and to submit a report. Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 108 Stat. 4107, 4147 (1994).
128. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission, supra note 124, at 126.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 2.
131. See H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 945, 106th Cong.(1999); S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 586, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1282, 106th Cong.(1999); H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3693, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3150, 105th
Cong. (1998); S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 530, 105th Cong. (1997).
132. See H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 308 (2001); S. 945, 106th Cong. § 320 (1999); S. 586,
106th Cong. § 2 (1999); H.R. 1282, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); H.R. 3693, 105th Cong. § 2
(1998); S. 530, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
133. See, e.g., S. 625, 106th Cong. § 308 (1999); H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 308 (2000);
H.R. 3693, 105th Cong. (1998). See also Robert Dodge, Senate Bill Tightens Bankruptcy
Criteria, Bush Backs Consumer Accountability, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Mar. 16,2001, at Al
(describing homestead limit in bill and Sen. Hutchison's opposition); Kay Bailey Hutchi-
son, Bankruptcy Bill Not Right Answer, SAN ANrONIo EXPRESS-NEws, Nov. 29 1999, at B5
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Against this backdrop, the Texas legislature, in a misguided attempt to
solve a minor problem in the home equity loan provision of the Texas
Constitution, adopted a resolution that, after approval by voters, in-
creased the maximum permissible size of the Texas urban homestead
from one to ten acres. 135 While this revision does permit homeowners
with urban homesteads between one and ten acres to obtain home equity
loans, it also permits very wealthy Texans to shield more property from
creditors outside of bankruptcy and, for the time being, in bankruptcy.
This change is likely to increase Congressional criticism of Texas home-
stead law and ultimately make more difficult the avoidance of a limit on
the Texas homestead in bankruptcy. Furthermore, the change does noth-
ing to make home equity loans available for homeowners with urban
homesteads greater than 10 acres or rural homeowners with homesteads
more than 200 acres. A more logical change would have modified the
prohibition on taking security other than the homestead to permit a lien
on land contiguous to the homestead to secure a home equity loan. Such
a measure would have permitted homeowners with homes located on any
size tract to obtain home equity loans without changing basic homestead
law.
The legislature failed to address any other problems in the Texas home
equity loan provision of the Texas Constitution in either the 76th or 77th
legislative sessions. Therefore, except to the extent that the courts have
intervened, the original criticisms concerning the lack of administrative
oversight and ambiguities in language remain.
B. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The courts have done substantially better than the legislature in resolv-
ing issues raised by the home equity loan amendment. The Texas Su-
preme Court has had two recent opportunities to address questions raised
by the home equity loan provision, in each case on certified question
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,'136 and
other courts have resolved additional issues.137
In Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.,' 38 the Texas Supreme Court
(criticizing Senate bill provision limiting homestead); Catalina Camia, Sessions Fights
Homestead Exemption Cap, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Mar. 28, 1999, at A9 (describing limits
in various bills and opposition)
134. See H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
135. Tex. S.J. Res. 22, 76h Leg., R.S., 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1510. The constitutional
amendment has also been criticized on the basis that it eliminates homestead protection
for urban business property unless it is contiguous to or a part of the residence. See Com-
ment, Christopher John Kern, Goodbye Texas Urban Business Homestead: An Analysis of
the November 1999 Amendment to Article XVI, Section 51 of the Texas Constitution, 52
BAYLOR L. REV. 663 (2000); John W. Gonzalez, Election '99: Judicial Amendment's Author
Says Loss Could Deter Qualified People, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 4, 1999, at 32.
136. Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2000); Doody v. Ameri-
quest Mortgage Co., 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001).
137. See infra notes 149-153.
138. 23 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2000).
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resolved a conflict between the constitutional requirements for a home
equity loan and the language of the constitutionally mandated notice.
The question raised by the conflict was whether a home equity lender
could require a borrower to pay off third party debt not secured by the
homestead with home equity loan proceeds.139 Among the constitutional
requirements for a home equity loan is one prohibiting a lender from
requiring a borrower to apply loan proceeds to repay any debt other than
one secured by the homestead or due to another lender. 140 The required
notice to a home equity borrower states that the lender may not require
the borrower to apply loan proceeds to a debt that is not secured by the
home or to a debt to the same lender. 141 The court held that section
50(a)(6) of the constitutional amendment sets forth the substantive rights
and obligations of home equity borrowers and lenders while section 50(g)
sets forth only the language of the required notice.1 42 Therefore, in a
conflict between the substantive provision and the notice provision, the
substantive provision would prevail.
In Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a refund of closing costs in excess of the three percent
constitutional cap cures the defect in the loan and validates the lien. 143
At the time of the closing of the home equity loan at issue, the lender,
Ameriquest, had charged Doody closing costs in an amount exceeding
three percent of the loan amount. 144 Ameriquest later discovered its er-
ror and refunded an amount necessary to reduce the total closing costs to
three percent. Doody accepted the refund but later sued claiming that
the loan did not comply with constitutional requirements and thus could
not create a valid lien on his homestead. 145
The court held that the cure provision can be used to validate a lien.146
In so holding, the court stated that all of the constitutional provisions
must be read together and that the cure provision was not limited to
avoidance of forfeiture. 47 In addition, the court distinguished cases cited
by Doody holding that a lender cannot resurrect an invalid lien after the
loan is made. 148 In this case, because the home equity loan amendment
139. Id. at 354.
140. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(i).
141. Id. § 50(g)(Q)(1).
142. 23 S.W.3d at 356. The court suggested that lenders include an additional notice to
avoid misleading or confusing home equity borrowers; however, the court provided no
penalty for a lender's failure to do so. Id. at 357.
143. 49 S.W.3d 342, 342 (Tex. 2001). The court did not reach the second question certi-
fied by the Fifth Circuit, whether the borrower's acceptance of a refund of an overcharged
amount waives any claims under the constitutional provision. Id. at 342-43.
144. Id. at 343.
145. Id. Doody argued that because Ameriquest did not comply with the constitutional
requirements for a home equity loan, its lien was never valid. Although the constitution
permits cure to avoid forfeiture, Doody argued that cure was not available to validate an
invalid lien. Ameriquest argued that the cure provision applies to validate the lien of a
home equity loan as well as to avoid forfeiture. Id.
146. Id. at 347.
147. Doody, 49 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2001).
148. Id. at 346.
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includes a cure provision, the lien can be validated by the lender's subse-
quent efforts. Therefore, the court held that the cure provision applied
not only to avoid forfeiture, but also to validate the lien.
Other courts have resolved issues relating to the constitutional provi-
sion that caps fees charged for a home equity loan at three percent. 149
The Doody case, discussed above, originated in federal court, and the
Fifth Circuit had addressed the fee cap issue before certifying questions
to the Texas Supreme Court. Doody argued to the Fifth Circuit that pre-
miums for hazard insurance required by the lender should be included
within the constitutional three percent cap.150 The Fifth Circuit held that
hazard insurance premiums are not "fees ... necessary to originate" the
loan and are thus not included within the three percent cap on fees. 151
More recently, the Waco Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether points charged by a lender are included within the fee cap. 152
The court held that points are interest and are, therefore, specifically ex-
cluded from the fee cap provision.1 53
In all, courts that have considered the constitutional provision to date
have taken a practical approach to interpreting the provision. While
there are issues left to be resolved, if the courts continue to take a com-
mon sense approach, lenders can continue to make home equity loans in
Texas, and Texas homeowners will be protected by the consumer protec-
tion provisions of the constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Critics of the constitutional restrictions on home equity loans in Texas
have focused on the placement of the home equity loan provision in the
state consitution, on problems in the language of the constitutional
scheme, and on its consumer protection philosophy. Certainly, a state
constitution is not the best place for detailed consumer protection mea-
sures because the procedure for making corrections to a constitutional
provision is so cumbersome. A statutory scheme would be much more
manageable. However, the history of constitutional protection of the
homestead in Texas runs deep, and a constitutional scheme for home equ-
ity lending is likely to remain in place, at least for the foreseeable future.
Critics of the language of the amendment are justified to some extent
as it certainly contains ambiguities. In addition, critics and lawyers may
strain interpretation of the provision to create litigation. The courts thus
far have done an admirable job of solving these problems with common
sense readings of the provision. A constitutional amendment to provide
149. Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 242 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2001); Tarver v. Se-
bring Capital Credit Corp., No. 10-00-394-CV, 2002 WL 122743 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002).
150. 242 F.3d at 289.
151. Id.
152. Tarver v. Sebring Capital Credit Corp., 2002 WL 122743 at *2.
153. Id. at *5.
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regulatory oversight of the provision, however, would be an additional
positive step that the legislature should consider in its next session.
Critics of the philosophy of protecting homeowners are simply wrong.
Home equity lending is an industry fraught with opportunities for fraud.
The experience of homeowners in other states is evidence of the tremen-
dous need for consumer protection in this arena. A few other states have
reacted to the predatory lending problem with statutes or regulatory
measures, and Congress is considering additional measures. In the
meantime, Texas homeowners have the protection granted by their con-
stitution. The constitution can by no means prevent all abuse, but it can
prevent some of the more common types of abuse. We should be proud
of and maintain our long-held Texas tradition of protecting the home.
